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Venture Capitalists’ Evaluations of Start-up Teams: Trade-offs, Knock-out 
Criteria, and the Impact of VC Experience   
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The start-up team plays a key role in venture capitalists’ evaluations of venture proposals. Our findings go 
beyond existing research, first by providing a detailed exploration of VCs’ team evaluation criteria, and 
second by investigating the moderator variable of VC experience. Our results reveal utility trade-offs 
between team characteristics and thus provide answers to questions such as “What strength does it take to 
compensate for a weakness in characteristic A?” Moreover, our analysis reveals that novice VCs tend to 
focus on the qualifications of individual team members, while experienced VCs focus more on team 
cohesion. Data was obtained in a conjoint experiment with 51 professionals in VC firms and analyzed 
using discrete choice econometric models. 
INTRODUCTION 
Research into the criteria venture capitalists use to assess venture proposals began in the 1970s and has 
been of constant interest to scholars until the present (Wells, 1974; Poindexter, 1976; Johnson, 1979; 
Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 1985; Muzyka et al., 1996; Shepherd, 1999; Franke et al., 
2006). Three reasons seem to explain the strong interest that this field of research has attracted. First, 
knowledge on VC evaluation criteria helps those seeking funds to better judge their own venture project 
and to avoid potential flaws in their proposals. Second, the findings provide members of the VC 
community with an aggregate view of the evaluation criteria in use and with an empirical basis for 
comparing their own judgment to that of their peers. And third, as VCs are considered experts in 
identifying promising new ventures, their evaluation criteria are often interpreted as success factors for 
emerging firms (Riquelme and Rickards, 1992; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2002). 
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The evaluation of venture proposals is one of the key activities of VCs. Previous studies indicate that 
VCs use various criteria to assess the attractiveness of venture projects, such as market growth and size, 
product offerings, the expected rate of return and the expected risk of a venture project (Tyebjee and 
Bruno, 1981; MacMillan et al., 1985). Prior research also shows that amongst the set of evaluation criteria, 
VCs place particular importance on criteria related to the start-up team (Wells, 1974; Poindexter, 1976; 
Tyebjee and Bruno, 1981; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Zopounidis, 1994; Muzyka et al., 1996; Shepherd, 
1999; Smart, 1999; Díaz de León and Guild, 2003; Silva, 2004). As a popular saying in the VC industry 
highlights, VCs would rather invest “in a grade A team with a grade B idea than in a grade B team with a 
grade A idea” (cf. Bygrave, 1997). 
Although the qualifications of the start-up team play a major role in VCs’ evaluations, knowledge of 
the criteria used in team evaluations remains on a fairly general level. This is largely due to the fact that 
most prior studies investigate the evaluation of complete venture proposals and thus provide aggregate 
criteria rankings such as (1) technical education, (2) new venture experience, and (3) focus strategy (e.g., 
Shrader et al., 1997). Whereas such results are important to obtain an overall understanding of VCs’ 
evaluations of venture proposals, they are necessarily limited in the depth of insight they can offer on team 
evaluations. Specifically, the existing results do not yet provide information on the importance of different 
parameter values for particular team characteristics. For example, if new venture experience is an 
important criterion, is it desirable that all team members possess such experience? Moreover, the existing 
results cannot reveal utility trade-offs among different team characteristics. If a team lacks industry 
experience, which potential strengths may compensate for such a shortcoming? Can it be offset at all, or 
are shortcomings in this regard a potential knock-out criterion? Hence, a more detailed understanding of 
team evaluation criteria is required. 
Recent research by Shepherd et al. (2003) suggests a second important extension to prior scholarly 
work on VC evaluation criteria. Drawing on cognitive theory, these authors find that the experience of 
VCs has a significant influence on their decision making. Because the assessment of team quality plays an 
  
3
important role in VCs’ decision making, the evaluation of start-up teams may also be subject to experience 
effects. Prior research has not yet addressed this question, although knowledge on the existence and 
direction of any experience effects would be crucial to theory development on VC decision making, to the 
design of future research studies, and also to VC practice and venture teams. 
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this study is twofold: First, we seek to provide a more detailed 
exploration of VCs’ evaluations of start-up team characteristics, and second, we explore whether novice 
and experienced VCs attach differing importance to these criteria. We apply a conjoint approach which 
allows an experimental variation of team characteristics. Prior research suggests that conjoint analysis is 
particularly suitable for research on VCs’ decision making (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999) as it yields 
more valid results than the more frequently used post hoc methodologies (e.g., questionnaires using 
Likert-type scales). Our sample consists of 51 VCs who were asked to rank 20 teams described in terms of 
seven characteristics. We analyze the rankings with discrete choice econometric models. 
This paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we review prior studies on the criteria used by VCs 
when evaluating start-up teams and draw on cognitive theory to argue why VC experience could be an 
important moderator variable. We then provide an overview of the conjoint research design used in this 
study and present our empirical findings. We conclude by outlining the implications of our results for 
research and practice. 
REVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH 
Criteria Used by VCs to Evaluate Start-up Teams 
As mentioned in the previous section, research into the criteria VCs use to assess venture proposals has 
a relatively long tradition. Yet, the more specific question of “How do VCs evaluate start-up teams?” – 
which could provide more detailed insights – has received only little attention to date, leading scholars to 
call for focused research on VCs’ evaluations of start-up teams (Timmons and Sapienza, 1992; Siegel et 
  
4
al., 1993). We briefly discuss the results of key studies investigating VCs’ evaluations of venture 
proposals and distill their findings on those criteria which are related to the evaluation of start-up teams.  
Table 1 provides an overview of prior research into the criteria VCs employ when assessing venture 
proposals. In this context, two observations seem to be noteworthy. First, the table shows that a wide 
variety of evaluation criteria have been suggested by the literature. In essence, however, it seems that they 
can be collated into four major groups, namely evaluation criteria related to (1) the product / service 
offering, (2) the market / industry, (3) the start-up team, and (4) the financial returns to be expected from 
the new firm. This observation is mirrored in the findings of Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), one of the most 
widely cited works in this area, which identified five basic evaluation criteria used by VCs: market 
attractiveness, product differentiation, managerial capabilities, environmental threat resistance and cash-
out potential. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
Second, we see that – although the existing results are somewhat heterogeneous – VCs consistently 
rank criteria related to the start-up team among the top three evaluation criteria. This result is already 
evident in the pioneering study by Wells (1974), who found that management commitment, products and 
markets were the key evaluation criteria in the VC decision-making process. The results from the large 
number of studies that followed show that at least one, but often two or even all three of the top-ranked 
criteria pertained to characteristics of the start-up team. For example, Muzyka et al. (1996) find that (1) 
the leadership potential of the lead entrepreneur, (2) the leadership potential of the management team, and 
(3) the recognized industry expertise in the team were most important in VCs’ evaluations of venture 
proposals. MacMillan et al. (1985) also investigated criteria which would disqualify a venture proposal. 
Again, the quality of the start-up team was key, as five of the ten most frequently rated criteria were 
related to the human capital base of the venture. The most recent findings stem from a field study by Silva 
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(2004) which did not provide an explicit ranking of criteria, yet highlighted the fact that the attention of 
VCs is heavily focused on assessing the quality of the start-up team. 
The available evidence thus indicates that evaluation criteria related to the start-up team are of major 
importance in VCs’ decision making. More specifically, characteristics which are frequently mentioned by 
VCs as desirable features of start-up teams are industry experience, leadership experience, managerial 
skills, and engineering/technological skills. However, a consideration of existing findings also shows that 
current knowledge on VCs’ evaluations is still rather general, a critique that has also been voiced by other 
scholars (Sandberg et al., 1988; Muzyka et al., 1996; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999). First, we still lack 
knowledge on the importance of different parameter values of particular team characteristics. For instance, 
relevant parameter values for the characteristic “educational background” might be (1) all team members 
have management education, (2) some have management education/some have engineering education, and 
(3) all have engineering education. Similarly, relevant parameter values for “industry experience” might 
be (1) all team members have industry experience, (2) some have industry experience, and (3) none have 
industry experience. However, the available results do not reveal the relative preference VCs attach to 
these parameter values. Second, the existing results cannot reveal utility trade-offs between different team 
characteristics. For example, if a team lacks leadership experience, which potential strengths might 
compensate for such a shortcoming?  
In summary, as knowledge on the parameter values of particular team characteristics and on trade-offs 
between different team characteristics is key to understanding VCs’ evaluations of start-up teams but still 
lacking, the first goal of this paper is to provide a focused exploration of team evaluation criteria.  
The Role of Experience in VC Decision Making 
A recent study by Shepherd et al. (2003) suggests a second important extension to research on VCs’ 
evaluations of venture proposals in general and the evaluation of start-up teams in particular. Drawing on 
cognitive theory, Shepherd et al. find that the experience of VCs has a significant impact on their decision 
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making. As the evaluation of human capital “has to do with making projections of future behaviours that 
human capital is likely to perform” (Smart, 1999) and human capital is one of the most important but 
difficult areas to assess in venture proposals (Kozmetsky et al., 1985), novice and experienced VCs may 
differ in their evaluation of start-up teams. 
Cognition research provides valuable insights into the development of expertise in decision making. To 
arrive at a judgment, decision makers select, combine, and evaluate information cues (Spence and Brucks, 
1997). The way in which information cues are processed is influenced by an individual’s cognitive 
structures (schemata). A schema is an organized network of knowledge that includes concepts, facts, 
skills, and action sequences (Gagné and Glaser, 1987). Schemata thus play an elemental role in all 
cognitive activities, such as predicting, explaining, and developing opinions (Rumelhart, 1980; Larkin et 
al., 1980; Waller and Felix, 1984; Matlin, 2005).  
Prior research shows that individuals refine their schemata in various ways as they acquire experience 
in a particular domain. For example, Lurigio and Carroll (1985) suggest that experienced individuals 
possess more complete and detailed schemata than inexperienced individuals. Experienced individuals 
also group domain-specific knowledge in more meaningful ways than those with little experience, will 
draw on clearer concepts, create richer connections between concepts, and will be able to apply domain-
specific problem-solving procedures they have developed over time (Adelson, 1981; Gobbo and Chi, 
1986; Knowlton, 1997; Matlin, 2005). For instance, they will learn about the importance of different 
dimensions of a decision problem (Shepherd et al., 2003). With respect to the evaluation of start-up teams, 
this suggests that VCs will become increasingly knowledgeable about the question of which team 
characteristics are required for successful new firm creation.  
Research on VCs’ decision making has not yet explored whether differences exist between the 
evaluation of start-up teams by novice VCs and by experienced VCs. However, knowledge on the 
existence and direction of such experience effects would be key for theory development on VC decision 
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making and also for VC practice and start-up teams. In particular, if it turns out that experience effects 
play a considerable role in VCs’ evaluations, future studies would need to control for that variable. 
Against the backdrop of these observations, this paper seeks to contribute to the literature on 
entrepreneurship by (1) exploring in detail the criteria VCs use in the evaluation of start-up teams and (2) 
exploring how the decision-making experience of VCs influences the importance attributed to team 
evaluation criteria.  
METHOD 
Our study uses conjoint analysis. As this method allows researchers to simulate respondents' decision 
processes in real time, it is in several ways superior to commonly used post-hoc methods which collect 
data on VCs’ self-reported decision policies (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999). In a conjoint experiment, 
respondents are asked to judge a series of profiles, that is, combinations of parameter values for several 
attributes. From the preferences revealed in this way, conclusions can be drawn about the contribution of 
the various parameter values of each attribute to the overall valuation a certain profile receives. In 
particular, trade-offs between different parameter values of the attributes under investigation are 
quantified. The application of this research method to our study is presented in the following paragraphs. 
Focus on the Initial Stage of the Evaluation Process 
VCs usually evaluate new venture proposals in a multi-stage process. An important early stage in this 
process is the appraisal of the business plan, where the decision is made whether to reject a venture 
proposal outright or to pursue it further by inviting the management team for a project presentation 
(Dixon, 1991; Bagley and Dauchy, 1999). Typically, 80% of all business plans submitted to a VC firm are 
rejected in this first round of evaluations, thus making it an important process for VCs and a crucial hurdle 
to pass for start-up teams (Roberts, 1991).  
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Our conjoint analysis focuses on this initial stage in the evaluation process of VCs and uses the team 
description given in the business plan as the basis for a decision experiment. Three arguments support the 
choice of this approach.  
First, when studying team evaluation criteria it is important to define the stage in the decision process 
where these criteria are applied.1 For example, whereas a team's educational background can be observed 
in the written business plan, the atmosphere within the team can only be observed during personal 
presentations, and qualities such as perseverance and stress resistance will only be observable in the long 
run.  
Second, selecting the initial stage of the evaluation process is advantageous as the team characteristics 
given in a business plan are comparatively objective, unlike criteria such as personal fit within the team, 
which VCs can only observe in later stages. Hence, the characteristics of the hypothetical teams in our 
study could be communicated unambiguously to the participants. 
Third, the evaluation of the start-up team’s description in a business plan is well suited for a conjoint 
approach. Unlike in most other conjoint experiments, where the respondent has to imagine some real-
world object based on a description on the conjoint card, the team description provided on our conjoint 
cards is of the same nature as the object itself (the team description given in the business plan). Thus, 
despite some necessary simplifications in team descriptions, the conjoint design employed here is 
relatively realistic, as the conjoint task closely resembles the task performed by the respondent in real life. 
                                                 
1
  Although criteria related to the start-up team are consistently ranked among the most important criteria in VCs’ 
decision making, there is also some scholarly debate on whether team criteria are of similar importance 
throughout the different stages of the evaluation process. To date, only few studies have differentiated between 
various evaluation stages. For example, the findings of Hall and Hofer (1993) suggest that human capital 
characteristics do not play a major role during the screening stage of venture proposals; however, their study also 
indicates that VCs do evaluate team characteristics during this stage. More recent ethnographic findings by Silva 
(2004) suggest that the description of human capital is an important source of information in the screening stage. 
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Construction of Team Descriptions 
An important issue in conjoint analyses is to keep the thought-experiments manageable for the 
interviewees. As the literature review has shown, prior studies suggest that VCs regard industry 
experience, leadership experience, managerial skills, and engineering/technological skills as key 
characteristics of start-up teams. Yet, it would be problematic to include only these potentially important 
characteristics in a thought-experiment. Thus, to identify any additional team characteristics frequently 
used in team descriptions and thus subjected to VCs’ evaluations, we conducted a pilot study that 
comprised seven exploratory interviews with VCs and a thorough analysis of two dozen real business 
plans. This led us to include four additional team characteristics – level of education, type of job 
experience (start-up vs. large firm), age, and mutual acquaintance within the team – to the criteria already 
mentioned above. Moreover, the pilot study provided information on the relevant parameter values for 
each of the seven team characteristics. For each characteristic, we included three different parameter 
values (see next Section, Table 4). 
The team size was fixed at four members. This was done for several reasons: First, our analysis of team 
descriptions in business plans showed that this is a common size for start-up teams. Second, as VCs 
usually provide support in finding individuals who could fill an open position in a management team, 
introducing varying team sizes into our conjoint design did not seem particularly important. Having an 
even number of team members also has the advantage that team attributes described as “some 
management, some engineering education” could be interpreted as an even split between the two 
subgroups. From these attributes and parameter values, we generated 20 profiles (a reduced set with two 
hold-outs) using a full rank order method of conjoint analysis. These cards were pretested with five VCs, 
who confirmed that the team attributes and their parameter values given on the conjoint cards were 
adequately chosen and that the task of ranking 20 hypothetical team profiles was indeed manageable.  
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Venture Type 
In conducting our conjoint experiment, we accounted for the fact that the evaluation of the start-up 
team is dependent on the type of venture project. For example, while new ventures in biotechnology 
usually need qualified scientists, new ventures in the software industry rely on founders who possess IT 
knowledge. As a result, it was necessary to specify the type of new venture which the start-up team under 
consideration wanted to pursue. On the other hand, an overly detailed description of the venture would 
have considerably raised the probability that individual respondents would identify the hypothetical start-
up with a particular real investment experience, thus jeopardizing the generality of our analysis. So, after 
discussing several alternative descriptions with experts from the VC industry, we decided to employ a 
description that indicates several characteristics of the hypothetical venture but at the same time remains 
sufficiently general (see Figure 1). 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
 
Sample 
Our sample consists of 51 conjoint experiments/interviews2 which were conducted at 26 different VC 
firms located in Munich, Berlin and Vienna. All of the respondents were actively involved in the 
evaluation of business plans. Apart from the conjoint experiments, background information on the 
respondents (age, education, professional experience, experience as a VC) and on the VC firms (size, 
volume of funds, specialization in industries or financing stages, evaluation process) was collected. As we 
used a convenience sample, our sample of VC firms cannot claim to be representative. A truly random 
                                                 
2
  As Shepherd and Zacharakis (1999) suggest as a rule of thumb, a sample size greater than 50 is normally 
sufficient. Previous studies used sample sizes of 73 VCs (Muzyka et al., 1996), 53 VCs (Zacharakis and Meyer, 
1998), and 66 VCs (Shepherd et al., 2000).  
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sample of interviewees is difficult to obtain given the time constraints in the VC industry and the time 
required for interviews (Smart, 1999). However, we did make efforts to obtain a mix of different types of 
VC firms. The description in Table 2 shows that our sample contains VC firms of different sizes, different 
industry focus and different degrees of internationalization. Since the VC firms were chosen to match our 
hypothetical venture project, obviously more of them invest in telecommunications, software, and e-/m-
commerce than in biotechnology. With regard to experience, our sample covers a sufficiently broad range 
in order to investigate the impact of different levels of experience. While the average experience is almost 
4 years of work as a VC, a substantial number of VCs interviewed had experience of 2 years or less 
(which is typical of the relatively young German VC industry).3  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
 
The conjoint experiments were conducted according to a fixed scheme by one interviewer who was 
present during the entire experiment. None of the participants encountered any problems in ranking the 
conjoint cards.  
Analysis 
We employ discrete choice methodology to identify the impact of various team characteristics on VCs’ 
evaluations. Our model interprets the 20 rankings assigned to the simulated teams by each of our 
respondents as a rank ordering of choices from a given set. A suitable estimator to analyze such data has 
been proposed by Beggs et al. (1981). Following Marden (1995), the model is also known as the Plackett-
                                                 
3
  Measuring experience by the number of years a decision-maker has worked as a VC was suggested by Shepherd 
et al. (2003). We also used the alternative operationalization of experience as the logarithm of the number of 
years the rater had been working as a VC. While the explanatory variables which are significant in this 
specification are also significant in the basic one – hence, the results do not contradict each other – some other 
coefficients lose their significance in the log specification. The likely explanation of this finding is that the 
logarithmic function is too steep for small values of the argument and too flat around the median. We therefore 
chose the dummy operationalization as the most appropriate one. 
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Luce or as the “exploded logit” model. The marketing literature refers to the model as the choice-based 
conjoint analysis method. 
To consider an example, an individual’s ranking of A-C-B-D in a choice set {A, B, C, D} is taken to 
represent an observation in which A is chosen as the most preferred alternative from the full set {A, B, C, 
D}; C is the preferred alternative from the restricted set {B, C, D}; and B is chosen as the preferred 
alternative from the set {B, D}.4 The model thus extends McFadden’s conditional logit to cases in which 
full ranking data is available.  
Our model presumes that all alternatives are assessed by our subjects using a cardinal assessment 
function which reflects the quality of the team (and thus the likelihood of obtaining a favorable financing 
decision) as a linear additive function of team characteristics. Let the venture capitalist’s assessment be 
denoted bik for the benefit that venture capitalist i would be able to draw from financing team k (out of a 
set of K alternatives). The ranking chosen by each venture capitalist emerges from a simple ordering of the 
K alternatives according to their bik values, which are functions of the team characteristics bik = Xikβ + εik, 
where Xik is a row vector of the characteristics of alternative k and (possibly) interaction terms between 
the characteristics of alternative k and of rater i, and β is a column vector of coefficients. Under the 
assumption that the error term εik follows an independent identically distributed extreme value 
distribution, the probability that any alternative k is ranked as the best one by respondent i is given by 
(1) prob{bik > max(bij) j≠k} = exp(Xikβ)/(Σ j exp(Xijβ)) . 
Returning to our earlier case in which the sequence of A-C-B-D is chosen from the choice set (A, B, C, 
D), the probability of observing this ranking from rater i would be given by5 
                                                 
4
  We use the model implementation in STATA 8.0 (command rologit). 
5
  A more detailed derivation of the likelihood function for this model is given in Hausman and Ruud (1987, pp. 
86).  
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(2) prob{ranking A-C-B-D}  =  [exp(XiAβ)/(Σ j=A,B,C,D exp(Xijβ))] ⋅ 
[exp(XiCβ)/(Σ j= B,C,D exp(Xijβ))] ⋅ 
[exp(XiBβ)/(Σ j= B, D exp(Xijβ))] 
In order to ensure convenient interpretation of our coefficient signs, we use the following parameter 
values as reference groups: age of team members between 25 and 35 years; no team member with a 
university degree; all team members have management education; team members have mostly large-firm 
experience; no team member with experience in the relevant industry; no team member with experience in 
leading teams of 5 to 10 individuals; team members have known each other for a short period of time. 
This choice of reference parameter values is based on the descriptive data analysis (see Table 4, next 
section) and is made in such a way that the reference parameter value is presumably the one with the 
lowest benefit.  
In our estimation, a team with these parameter values will automatically be assigned a benefit value of 
zero, since the associated coefficient vector β is implicitly set to zero. In order to model parameter values 
deviating from the reference team, we employ a dummy variable technique where a separate dummy is 
used for the two other parameter values of each team variable. In addition, we interact, in the extended 
specification, all terms with a dummy variable i∆  indicating that rater i’s experience is above the median. 
Hence, our full specification of the benefit bik that rater i would expect to derive from team k can be 
written as follows: 
 
( ) ik
j
kjijkjijkjjkjjik DDDDb εββββ +∆+∆++= ∑
=
7
1
24132211  
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Analysis 
Before turning to multivariate analysis, we briefly explore some simple associations between the 
ranking of the team, that is, the level of team success, and the variables which presumably have an impact 
on success in order to give some intuition on the findings and demonstrate their robustness. We measure 
the success of each team by computing the share of cases in which the team was ranked among the top 
four teams, the upper quintile. This share variable can be interpreted as the team’s likelihood of reaching a 
certain cutoff level (the top 20 percent) which would (hypothetically) lead to an invitation to meet with a 
VC.6  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
 
Table 3 lists the teams and their characteristics in the order of the share of top quintile rankings 
achieved in our conjoint design. Since we use a reduced conjoint design, the “dream team” configuration, 
that is, the theoretically best profile, will not necessarily be among the twenty profiles presented to the 
interviewees. Team 10, which receives top quintile rankings in 96.1 percent of all cases, is therefore the 
most preferred team in the choice set according to our success variable, but not necessarily the 
theoretically optimal team configuration. While Table 3 shows that the top quintile share decreases 
quickly among the first ten teams, it is difficult to extract clear information on the relative contribution of 
the various team characteristics from the simple ranking performed here. However, there appears to be a 
                                                 
6
  Obviously, taking the top quintile as our measure is an arbitrary choice. However, it does represent a reasonable 
compromise, as taking the share of top rankings (i.e., how often a team is considered the best one) would lead to 
an ambiguous result for many teams which never reach that position, while taking the top ten ranking would not 
discern very clearly between “above-average” teams of similar quality.  
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positive relationship between (favorable) ranking and industry experience, leadership experience, and the 
age of team members. It is more difficult to derive clear statements with respect to the other variables 
from the aggregate ranking information. 
Whereas Table 3 shows complete team profiles, Table 4 presents the “success information” treating the 
parameter values of the team characteristics as fully independent. This table allows us to get a clearer 
impression of which team characteristics and which parameter values are likely to be important. For 
example, in 6 of our 20 team descriptions all team members have industry experience. Given 51 
interviews, this yields 306 observations, of which 110 (35.9%) were ranked among the top 4 teams.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
 
For the attributes “industry experience”, “field of education”, “acquaintance” and “age”, we find a 
clear preference for a particular parameter value in that the distance from the respective next-best 
parameter value is larger than 10%. Preferred teams are those in which all members have industry 
experience, their educational background is mixed (some engineering, some management expertise), 
founders have known each other for a longer time professionally, and members are older (aged 35 to 45).  
For the remaining three characteristics, a somewhat less transparent picture emerges: with regard to 
university training, prior job experience in corporate or start-up environments, and leadership experience, 
the best and second-best parameter values do not differ greatly when evaluated according to the share of 
top quintile rankings.  
Note that Table 4 summarizes seven bivariate relationships – it is therefore not a substitute for a 
multivariate analysis. Nor does this table give us the opportunity to generate inference results. Hence, 
while Tables 3 and 4 provide some indication of which team characteristics are particularly important, a 
multivariate treatment of the data is required in order to arrive at a more structured response to our 
research questions. 
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Discrete Choice Analysis – Model Specification 
The results of estimating the rank-ordered logit model are presented in Table 5. In specification (1), we 
use only the team characteristics as explanatory variables, while in specifications (2) to (5) we introduce 
interaction terms with the dummy variable ∆i, which indicates whether the rater is an experienced VC. In 
essence, the upper half of columns (2) to (5) (i.e., those coefficients shown in the first part of Table 5) 
describe the choice behavior of less experienced VCs, while the lower half describes the difference 
between the preferences of more and less experienced raters.  
Before interpreting the results, we need to discuss whether our findings are consistent with the 
assumption that our subjects have provided us with full rankings of the alternatives. There is considerable 
doubt in the literature that this assumption is always justified (Hausman and Ruud, 1987). What might 
have happened – and comments from our interviewees provide some evidence to this effect – is that 
subjects do spend effort on the upper ranks but pay less attention to the lower ones. In this case, 
heteroskedasticity will be introduced, which (in this model) will lead to inconsistent estimates if the full 
ranking information is used. For this reason, we present several specifications which differ with respect to 
the number of ranks taken into account. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, we present rank-ordered logit 
estimates which take the full rankings at face value. In specifications (3) / (4) / (5), in contrast, only the 
top 16 / 12 / 8 ranks are taken into account, while the residual ranks are treated as non-informative.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
 
In essence, we discard information in columns (3) through (5) and should thus expect the precision of 
our estimates to decrease as more and more rankings are discarded. Indeed, even a cursory glance at the 
results shows that standard errors increase monotonically from column (2) to column (5). Moreover, the 
estimates show a second well-known pattern – the coefficients increase in size as we discard more of the 
lower ranks in our estimate. Hausman and Ruud (1987) argue that this phenomenon is consistent with the 
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lower ranks being evaluated less carefully than the upper ones.7 Still, while the coefficients increase 
overall, their relative size remains largely stable.  
Discrete Choice Analysis – Pooled Results 
We start by discussing the pooled results for all respondents (specification (1)) before addressing the 
differences due to the rater’s level of experience. In discussing the pooled results, we first analyze the 
relative importance of the various team characteristics and then address the benefit contribution of the 
various parameter values for each characteristic. Finally, we consider trade-offs between different 
parameter values for different characteristics.  
We define the “importance” of a characteristic as the difference between the benefit contributions (i.e., 
the estimated coefficient) of the most and least preferred parameter values, normalized such that the sum 
of all importance values yields 100%. In other words, the importance of a characteristic is that share of the 
value difference between the best and the worst possible team which can be attributed to this 
characteristic.8 Given that the reference parameter value, by construction, has a benefit contribution of 
zero for most characteristics, the importance is essentially the (normalized) benefit contribution of the 
most preferred parameter value.9 
                                                 
7
  We did, in fact, estimate models for all possible specifications, both with and without interaction terms: using all 
ranks, the top 19 ranks etc., down to using only the top 6 ranks (with even fewer ranks, convergence was not 
attained). With very few exceptions, the coefficients’ signs and significance levels remain stable. 
8
  The importance of a characteristic obviously depends on the available parameter values. The more similar these 
are, the lower the characteristic’s importance will turn out to be. Hence, “importance” must be interpreted with 
the underlying parameter values in mind. For this reason, a realistic choice of parameter values for our 
experiment was paramount. Note that by explicitly defining the parameter values we avoid another problem of 
surveys using rating scales: when asked about the importance of industry experience, for example, each 
respondent bases his or her assessment on personal experiences regarding this characteristic’s typical parameter 
values. A VC who has never seen a team without industry experience will likely attribute lower importance to 
this characteristic than one who has.  
9
  In more detail, the importance values are calculated as follows. The contribution of industry experience to the 
overall score of the best team, compared to that of the worst team, equals 1.986 (see Figure 2 or the first column 
of Table 5), that of the field of education 1.113, that of leadership experience 0.725 etc. Normalization then 
yields the numbers given in the text following this footnote: 1.986 / (1.986 + 1.113 + 0.725 + …) = 0.322 etc. 
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As Figure 2 illustrates, industry experience is by far the most important characteristic (32.2%). While 
this in itself is not a new insight, our approach allows a meaningful comparison of characteristics beyond a 
mere ordering of their relative importance. In particular, we find that industry experience is 1.8 times – i.e. 
almost twice – as important as the field of education, which ranks second in overall importance (18.0%). 
Third comes academic education with 16.2%, meaning that it is about half as important as industry 
experience. Less importance is attributed to leadership experience (11.7%), the team members’ mutual 
acquaintance within the team (9.5%), and age (8.4%). The type of prior job experience ranks last at 4.0%.  
We now delve deeper into the benefit contributions of each characteristic’s parameter values. To begin 
with, we find that the marginal benefit contribution of having more team members with industry 
experience decreases strongly. When only some team members have relevant experience, the benefit 
contribution (1.61) is about 80% of that attained when all founders know the industry (1.99). Hence, while 
having no industry experience seems to be a conditio sine qua non (knock-out criterion) for a VC 
evaluating a venture team, it will often be sufficient to have some industry insiders on board.  
For the field of education, the relative benefit contribution of the various parameter values confirms the 
insight that a heterogeneous team comprising technical and management skills is much desired (benefit 
contribution 1.11). A management-only team is clearly not viable (benefit contribution 0), which was to 
be expected given the technical nature of our business model. Despite the model's technical nature, 
however, teams consisting entirely of engineers also fare so badly that this parameter value (benefit 
contribution 0.27) seems like a disqualifier for advancing to further stages in the evaluation process.  
For the team’s level of education, we find that an academic background is essential, but that it hardly 
makes a difference whether some or all team members have an academic background. While a team with 
only some university graduates is slightly preferred, the difference between the two coefficients in Table 5 
is insignificant. This could mean that VCs see the participation of founders with university degrees as a 
positive signal – which, however, does not improve further when the number of graduates in the team 
increases from “some” to “all”; in fact, it decreases. Alternatively, an “all university” team may mean a 
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higher average level of human capital, while a mixed team offers (desirable) heterogeneity. When these 
two effects are of equal size, we should observe (as we do) equal benefit contributions for both parameter 
values.  
For leadership experience, we find a pattern similar to the one identified for industry experience. 
Having no members with leadership experience (benefit contribution 0) is likely to be a knock-out 
criterion in the evaluation process. However, the benefit contribution of “some team members with 
leadership experience” (0.70) is nearly identical to that of “all team members” (0.73). This is a rather 
plausible finding, since not all members in a venture team can assume a leadership role. Note, however, 
that this is only true in the early stages of the start-up, whereas after successful expansion all founders 
might find themselves in leading positions and thus need leadership experience.  
With regard to mutual acquaintance, we find that the type of acquaintance is just as important as its 
duration. Being acquainted for a long time is less than half as valuable (benefit contribution 0.25) when 
based on private relationships than when it is based on professional collaboration (benefit contribution 
0.59).  
As for age, we find that having only young team members (aged 25 to 35) on board yields the lowest 
evaluation (zero). This result is consistent with anecdotal evidence from VCs who had negative 
experiences with “boy groups” during the e-commerce boom. What is surprising is that having some more 
senior people in addition to young members on the team only partly remedies the problem: a mixed team 
with members aged between 25 and 45 (benefit contribution 0.19) still fares much worse than a team 
consisting exclusively of older founders (35 – 45, benefit contribution 0.52).  
Finally, for the type of prior job experience, we find similar positive benefit contributions for 
heterogeneous teams (i.e., those whose members have experience partly in large firms, partly in start-ups) 
(0.22) and teams in which members have only start-up experience (0.25). However, even though both 
coefficients are significant, their size shows that VCs seem to care comparatively little about this team 
characteristic. 
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Discrete Choice Analysis – Effects of VC Experience 
We now explore whether VC experience has a significant moderating effect on the evaluation of start-
up teams. Overall, we find that both more and less experienced raters attach the highest importance to 
industry experience and the lowest to the type of prior professional experience. However, our analysis also 
reveals some key differences. The level of academic education ranks second for less experienced VCs 
(importance: 22.1%) and only fourth for their more experienced colleagues (10.8%). Leadership 
experience is ranked fourth (14.8%) by novices and sixth (8.1%) by experienced raters. The latter, in turn, 
attach more importance to mutual acquaintance within the team (ranked third at 14.7%) than less 
experienced VCs (ranked sixth at 4.9%). 
Table 5 provides more detailed insights into the ratings of novice and experienced VCs. As 
specifications (2) to (5) show, we consistently find significant differences between the preferences of 
novice and experienced VCs for each parameter value of the following three characteristics: Leadership 
experience, mutual acquaintance, and academic education. In addition, heterogeneous prior job experience 
(some start-up, some large firm) receives significantly higher ratings from experienced raters in 
specifications (4) and (5), as does a higher age (35 – 45) in specification (4). As the results of 
specifications (2) to (5) are identical in qualitative terms, and as we seek comparability with the basic 
model (1), the following discussion will focus on specification (2).  
Figure 3 displays the coefficients of the interaction terms as given in the second part of Table 5. 
Coefficients significantly different from zero on the 1% level are rendered as solid black bars, those 
significant on the 5% level as hatched bars. We find the largest and most significant differences between 
novice and experienced raters in the perceived benefit contribution of a university degree. All team 
members having a university degree leads to a benefit contribution of 1.51 for a novice VC, and of only 
0.38 (i.e., 1.51 – 1.13) for experienced VCs. While the latter value is still positive and significantly 
different from zero (1% level), it is only a quarter of the size of the value for novices. We obtain similar 
results for the benefit contribution of “some team members having a university degree”: 0.69 for more vs. 
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1.33 (1% level) for less experienced VCs, a difference of -0.64 (see Figure 3). Furthermore, the preference 
order between purely academic and mixed teams is reversed for experienced raters: with a difference of 
0.21, they significantly (1% level) prefer mixed teams, while their less experienced colleagues 
(insignificantly) prefer, by a margin of 0.17, teams in which all members have a university degree.  
Leadership experience is also valued significantly less by experienced raters. Novices value leadership 
experience with a benefit contribution of 1.0 and attach little importance to whether all or some team 
members have such experience. In both cases, the benefit contributions perceived by experienced VCs are 
smaller by a value of roughly 0.5. While they are still highly significant (1% level), they are only about 
half as large as the values we obtained from less experienced raters.  
The one characteristic for which we find a significantly higher valuation among experienced raters is 
mutual acquaintance within the team. If team members have known each other for a long time 
professionally, senior VCs perceive a benefit contribution which is 0.64 higher than their younger 
colleagues (0.94 vs. 0.30). Given a long-standing private acquaintance, the difference is 0.59, with novices 
perceiving no benefit contribution at all (-0.03, not significant) in that parameter value.  
DISCUSSION 
Criteria related to the start-up team are key in VCs’ evaluation of venture proposals. We believe that 
this study makes two contributions to the literature. First, by focusing on VCs’ evaluations of venture 
teams, we offer more detailed insights on desired team characteristics than previous research. Second, our 
study extends the research of Shepherd et al. (2003) comparing decision-making by VCs with varying 
experience. Our analysis reveals significant differences between novice and experienced VCs’ 
evaluations. We discuss these two contributions and their implications for research and practice in turn. 
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Team Characteristics and Trade-offs  
Our findings indicate that industry experience, educational background, and leadership experience are 
the three most important team characteristics. These general results are consistent with the findings of 
most prior studies (see “Review of Prior Research” and Table 1).  
Our results go beyond the existing research by indicating the importance of different parameter values 
and by providing insights on utility trade-offs between different team characteristics. For industry 
experience as well as leadership experience, we find that it may suffice when only some team members 
possess it. Regarding the field of education, heterogeneous teams are strongly preferred over teams where 
all members have an engineering background or a management background.  
As illustrative examples, consider the following ceteris paribus comparisons. A team whose members 
have known each other privately for a long time and are between 35 and 45 years old receives the same 
evaluation as a team whose members have a long-standing professional acquaintance and who are (all or 
some) between 25 and 35 years of age. That is, the bonus of a more senior team equals that of being 
acquainted for a long time through a professional (not a private) relationship. As a second example, 
consider team A, in which all members have industry experience, compared to team B, in which nobody 
knows the industry. We know from anecdotal evidence as well as our analysis that team B has hardly any 
chance of being considered for funding. However, despite its high level of industry experience, even team 
A is not guaranteed success if it performs badly in too many other dimensions. Hence the question: what 
other shortcomings have, in sum, the same effect as a lack of industry experience? According to our 
results, the two teams will receive roughly the same evaluation if the members of team B have a mixed 
educational background (some management, some engineering), some or all have a university degree, and 
they have known each other for a long time privately, while team A consists entirely of engineers with no 
university degree and only a short mutual acquaintance. In other words, the latter three parameter values 
lead to a penalty corresponding to that of having no industry experience – and will likely mean no funding 
for these founders. 
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Evaluations by Novice vs. Experienced VCs 
Our results also go beyond existing research by exploring whether VCs’ experience has a significant 
moderating effect on the evaluation of start-up teams. On the one hand, we find that novice and 
experienced VCs both see industry experience as the most important criterion. Both groups also rank the 
field of education among the top three criteria, and the type of prior professional experience as the least 
important criterion. On the other hand, however, novice and experienced VCs also critically diverge in 
some of their preferences. The most striking difference is mutual acquaintance among team members, 
which is ranked among the top three criteria by experienced VCs, whereas novice VCs rank it in the 
second to last spot.  
In order to illustrate the size of the experience effect, consider a team in which no founder holds a 
university degree and whose members have known each other professionally for a long time. Ceteris 
paribus, this team’s evaluation by an experienced VC would be 1.76 points higher than that of a novice – 
a utility difference nearly as large as the one between all team members vs. no team members having 
industry experience (1.99).  
We view the rankings of experienced VCs to be more valid indicators of desirable team characteristics, 
although the beneficial effect of growing expertise has not remained unchallenged. The aforementioned 
empirical study by Shepherd et al. (2003) provides evidence of a curvilinear relationship between VC 
experience and decision performance, and suggests that decision effectiveness declines after 
approximately 14 years of experience in venture capital. Yet, as most VCs in our “experienced” group are 
well below this 14 year threshold, we believe that their evaluations are indeed more valid indicators of 
desirable team characteristics than those made by novice VCs.  
Apart from the important finding that novice and experienced VCs differ significantly in certain 
preferences, an interesting pattern emerges with respect to the type of criteria valued differently by both 
groups. Our results suggest that team cohesion (as evidenced by mutual acquaintance among team 
members) is of high importance to experienced VCs, whereas novice VCs tend to emphasize individual-
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level, more tangible characteristics such as university degrees and prior leadership experience in start-up 
teams. Using a somewhat clichéd yet still useful metaphor, it seems that experienced VCs attribute 
relatively more importance to the “forest” than to the “trees” when evaluating start-up teams. More 
research is needed to see whether this pattern holds in the evaluation of full venture proposals.  
Implications for Start-up Teams and VCs 
For start-up teams seeking VC backing or consultants advising teams in early-stage venture 
development, our results offer an opportunity for team assessment. Provided with a more detailed 
understanding of the criteria VCs apply in their decision making, incomplete teams can try to find 
additional members to optimize their profile and their chances of obtaining VC financing. Faced with a 
choice between multiple potential new members, our results offer guidance as to who will make the best 
complement for a team. When a new firm has a high-quality team in place, our results will help team 
members make a clear and concise presentation of the team’s quality in the business plan document.  
Furthermore, at least two important implications for VCs are suggested by our findings. First, as novice 
VCs tend to be those employees in VC firms who are responsible for the initial screening of business 
plans, they are important gatekeepers whose decisions significantly impact the deal flow that more 
experienced VCs will evaluate at a later stage of the investment process. The divergence identified in team 
evaluations could prove problematic when novice VCs reject venture proposals on the basis of a negative 
assessment of criteria which experienced VCs would have evaluated more positively. As a result, VC 
firms may pass up interesting investment opportunities early on in the investment process. In this regard, 
our results also inform the VC community of the potential training needs of individuals entering the VC 
profession.  
Second, individual VC firms can apply the method developed in this paper to develop a clearer 
understanding of their own decision processes. For example, deviations between agreed-upon investment 
policies and actual decisions can be uncovered and addressed. Furthermore, this method allows VCs to 
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benchmark their own decision process (as regards teams) against that of other firms – a practice that could 
be particularly beneficial, as there seems to be room for improvement in the decision-making process of 
VCs (Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2002).  
Implications for Future Research 
Our results also offer several interesting insights for future research. First, as this study reveals 
significant differences in the team evaluations of novice and experienced VCs, it may be fruitful to extend 
this line of research by investigating whether experience also has a significant impact on the evaluation of 
other aspects of venture proposals. For example, it may well be that the assessment of business models 
(e.g., Amit and Zott, 2000) could be subject to experience effects. Whereas novice VCs may look at single 
components of business models (e.g., transaction efficiency), experienced VCs may place more weight on 
the fit of the various components, and thus may arrive at a better understanding of the overall value 
creation potential of the proposed venture.  
Second, our findings reveal that future studies on VC decision making need to control for VC 
experience to avoid sample selection bias. Whereas biases arising from sample selection are troublesome 
in any kind of research, they seem to be particularly problematic in studies of VC decision making, as the 
findings of these studies are often interpreted as success factors in new firm creation.  
Third, as our sample is comprised of a high share of less experienced VCs, future research could look 
more closely at VCs that have more than 10 to 14 years of experience, and investigate whether this 
additional experience has an impact on team evaluations (or evaluations of other aspects of venture 
proposals, see above). As noted previously, prior research indicates that decision effectiveness will 
decrease after a certain number of years in the VC profession. 
Fourth, by exploring evaluation criteria this study focused on content issues in VC decision making. 
Smart (1999) investigated the methods VCs apply when assessing human capital (e.g., job analysis, work 
sample, reference interview) and thus complements our research with a tool-oriented process perspective. 
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Future research could combine content- and process-oriented perspectives, and such research could also 
help in developing actuarial decision models (Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000). 
Finally, this research was carried out in Germany and Austria, which might make the results specific to 
these countries. However, the maturing European VC scene in general is closely modeled on the US 
example, and 36% of our interviewees work with US venture capital firms. We tested whether the 
evaluation results differed between these respondents and the remainder of the sample but did not find any 
significant differences. Hence, we would not expect to see large differences between our results and a 
potential replication study conducted in the US.  
The perceived quality of the start-up team is of major importance in VCs’ decision making. This paper 
adds to the growing literature on VCs’ decision making by providing detailed evidence on their evaluation 
of start-up teams and by uncovering how the experience of VCs affects such evaluations.  
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TABLE 1 
Survey of the Literature 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
 
Sample 
 
 
Method 
 
 
Evaluation criteria by rank order of importance 
 
Wells (1974) 8 VCs personal 
interviews 
(1) Management commitment 
(2) Product 
(3) Market 
Poindexter (1976) 97 VCs mail survey (1) Quality of management 
(2) Expected rate of return  
(3) Expected risk 
Johnson (1979) 49 VCs mail survey (1) Management 
(2) Policy / strategy 
(3) Financial criteria 
Tyebjee/Bruno 
(1981) 
46 VCs phone interviews (1) Management skills and history 
(2) Market size / growth 
(3) Rate of return 
MacMillan/Siegel/ 
Narasimha (1985) 
102 VCs mail survey 
 
(1) Capability for sustained intense effort 
(2) Familiarity with the target market 
(3) Expected rate of return 
Goslin/Barge (1986) 30 VCs mail survey (1) Management experience 
(2) Marketing experience 
(3) Complementary skills in team 
Robinson (1987) 53 VCs mail survey (1) Personal motivation 
(2) Organizational/managerial skills 
(3) Executive/managerial experience 
Rea (1989) 18 VCs mail survey (1) Market 
(2) Product 
(3) Team credibility 
Dixon (1991) 30 VCs personal 
interviews 
(1) Managerial experience in the sector 
(2) Market sector 
(3) Marketing skills of management team 
Muzyka/Birley/ 
Leleux (1996) 
73 VCs 
 
personal, 
standardized 
interviews 
(1) Leadership potential of lead entrepreneur 
(2) Leadership potential of management team 
(3) Recognized industry expertise in team 
Bachher/Guild 
(1996) 
40 VCs personal 
interviews 
(1) General characteristics of the entrepreneur(s)  
(2) Target market 
(3) Offering (product/service) 
Shrader/Steier/ 
McDougall/Oviatt 
(1997) 
214 new 
ventures 
with IPO 
interviews, 
publicly available 
documents 
(1) Technical education 
(2) New venture experience 
(3) Focus strategy 
Shepherd (1999) 66 VCs conjoint 
experiment 
(personal/mail)  
(1) Industry related competence 
(2) Educational capability 
(3) Competitive rivalry 
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TABLE 2 
Demographics of VC firms and individuals surveyed 
 
VC firms (N = 26) 
Firm age (years): mean = 8.2, standard dev. = 12.6, median = 3, range: 1-56 
Firm size (number of professionals): mean = 75.4, standard dev. = 202.8, median = 9, range: 1-800 
Volume of funds (EUR):*  <10 m: 2; 26-100 m: 8; 101-250 m: 5; >250 m: 9; n.a.: 2 
Investment stage:* ** seed: 10; start-up: 17; first-stage: 20; expansion: 17; later stages: 8 
Industry focus:* ** telecommunication: 23; software: 22; e-/m-commerce: 19;  
 electrical engineering: 13; biotechnology: 10; services: 5; other: 13 
Location of interviews (offices):* Munich: 40; Vienna: 7; Berlin: 4 
 
Individuals (N = 51) 
Age:   mean = 35.0, standard dev. = 6.7, median = 34, range: 24-57 
Education level:* **  apprenticeship: 4; university degree: 51; MBA: 15; doctorate: 11 
Education type:* **   business/economics: 39; engineering: 18; science: 6; law: 3; other: 2 
VC experience (years):   mean = 3.9, standard dev. = 5.2, median = 2, range: 0-30 
Tenure with firm (years):  mean = 2.4, standard dev. = 2.0, median = 2, range: 0-11 
Number of business plans evaluated: mean = 460, standard dev. = 455, median = 300, range: 0-2000 
Prior professional experience:   Type of firm:* ** start-up: 22; SME: 23; large firm: 35; no prior experience: 0 
  Industry:* **  management consulting: 28; manufacturing: 25; financial services: 13; other: 9 
Leadership experience:*   none: 9; 1-5 subordinates: 20; 6-20 subordinates: 16; >20 subordinates: 6 
 
*
 For categorical variables, the number of respondents who chose the respective category is given. ** Multiple answers possible. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics on Team Characteristics 
  
 
team 
number 
 
 
share of top quintile 
rankings (%) 
 
 
relevant 
industry 
experience 
 
field of education  
 
leadership 
experience 
 
acquaintance 
among team 
members 
 
university 
degree 
 
age of team 
members 
 
prior job 
experience 
 10  96.1 all mixed some professional some 35 to 45 start-up 
 3  60.8 some mixed all brief some 25 to 45 mixed 
 13  58.8 some mixed all private all 35 to 45 corporate 
 16  47.1 all all engineering some brief all 35 to 45 mixed 
 15  25.5 all all management all private all 25 to 35 start-up 
 8  25.5 all all management all professional none 25 to 45 mixed 
 6  23.5 some all management some professional some 25 to 35 corporate 
 19  15.7 some all engineering all private all 25 to 45 corporate 
 5  11.8 some all engineering none professional all 25 to 45 start-up 
 7  11.8 all mixed none brief none 25 to 35 corporate 
 12  9.8 all all engineering none private some 25 to 45 corporate 
 2  7.8 some all engineering some private none 25 to 35 mixed 
 18  5.9 none mixed none professional all 25 to 35 mixed 
 14  0.0 none all engineering all professional none 35 to 45 corporate 
 9  0.0 none mixed some private none 25 to 45 start-up 
 11  0.0 some all management none brief none 35 to 45 start-up 
 4  0.0 none all engineering all brief some 25 to 35 start-up 
 1  0.0 none all management some brief all 25 to 45 corporate 
 20  0.0 none all engineering some brief some 25 to 45 corporate 
 17  0.0 none all management none private some 35 to 45 mixed 
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TABLE 4  
Percentage of teams with a given parameter value that are ranked in the top quintile 
 
Variable Parameter  
value 1 
Parameter 
value 2 
Parameter 
value 3 
relevant industry experience 0.8% 
none 
25.5% 
some 
35.9% 
all 
field of education 12.4% 
all management 
38.9% 
some management, 
some engineering 
11.5% 
all engineering 
experience in leading teams 
(5 to 10 people) 
6.5% 
none 
24.9% 
some 
26.6% 
all 
acquaintance among team 
members 
17.1% 
brief 
16.8% 
for a longer time, 
privately 
27.1% 
for a longer time, 
professionally 
level of education: university 
degree 
7.5% 
none of the team 
members 
27.2% 
some team members 
23.5% 
all team members 
Age of team members 12.4% 
25-35 years 
33.7% 
35-45 years 
15.4% 
25-45 years 
prior job experience: type of 
firm 
15.0% 
mostly large firms 
24.5% 
some large firms, 
some start-up 
22.2% 
mostly start-up 
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TABLE 5 (Part 1) 
Rank-Ordered Logit Results 
 
Explanatory variables: 
Team characteristics. In spec. 
(2) to (5), coefficients refer 
only to inexperienced VCs 
(1)  
no 
interactions, 
all 20 ranks 
(2)  
with 
interactions, 
all 20 ranks 
(3) 
with  
interactions,  
top 16 ranks 
(4) 
with 
interactions, 
top 12 ranks 
(5) 
with 
interactions, 
top 8 ranks 
1.986*** 1.980*** 1.992*** 2.278*** 2.767*** experience in relevant industry 
– all team members (0.191) (0.241) (0.254) (0.253) (0.371) 
1.614*** 1.519*** 1.476*** 1.649*** 1.706*** experience in relevant industry 
– some team members (0.165) (0.205) (0.218) (0.240) (0.281) 
0.265** 0.462** 0.488** 0.653** 0.860** field of education –   
all engineering (0.120) (0.201) (0.201) (0.288) (0.354) 
1.113*** 1.194*** 1.269*** 1.497*** 2.031*** field of education – some 
engineering, some mgmt. (0.127) (0.198) (0.213) (0.271) (0.346) 
0.725*** 1.001*** 1.029*** 1.165*** 1.498*** leadership experience –  
all team members (0.116) (0.173) (0.195) (0.264) (0.341) 
0.704*** 1.012*** 1.078*** 1.129*** 1.650*** leadership experience –  
some team members (0.111) (0.161) (0.175) (0.213) (0.320) 
0.585*** 0.300* 0.321** 0.408** 0.831*** acquaintance –  
for a long time, professionally (0.143) (0.153) (0.147) (0.187) (0.240) 
0.247** -0.034 -0.033 -0.048 0.082 acquaintance –  
for a long time, privately (0.121) (0.134) (0.109) (0.148) (0.236) 
0.912*** 1.505*** 1.577*** 1.432*** 2.144*** university degree –  
all team members (0.149) (0.236) (0.270) (0.296) (0.353) 
1.003*** 1.332*** 1.363*** 1.213*** 1.530*** university degree –  
some team members (0.110) (0.169) (0.214) (0.192) (0.208) 
0.191*** 0.128 0.096 -0.011 0.148 age of team members  
between 25 and 45 (0.070) (0.079) (0.080) (0.100) (0.201) 
0.517*** 0.517*** 0.397*** 0.237 -0.270 age of team members  
between 35 and 45 (0.101) (0.166) (0.153) (0.156) (0.265) 
0.221** 0.176* 0.181 0.084 0.053 prior job experience – some 
large firm, some startup (0.087) (0.106) (0.111) (0.108) (0.157) 
0.246*** 0.273** 0.204 0.217 -0.090 prior job experience –  
mostly startup (0.083) (0.117) (0.134) (0.140) (0.126) 
Table to be continued on the following page 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
Explanatory variables: 
Team characteristics interacted  
with dummy variable ∆i 
(∆i = 1 if rater is experienced) 
(1)  
no 
interactions, 
all 20 ranks 
(2)  
with 
interactions, 
all 20 ranks 
(3) 
with  
interactions,  
top 16 ranks 
(4) 
with 
interactions, 
top 12 ranks 
(5) 
with 
interactions, 
top 8 ranks 
 0.258 0.345 0.392 0.223 ∆i × experience in relevant  
industry – all team members 
 (0.391) (0.420) (0.400) (0.478) 
 0.326 0.436 0.470 0.624 ∆i × experience in relevant  
industry – some team members 
 (0.356) (0.381) (0.382) (0.411) 
 -0.397 -0.330 -0.289 -0.103 ∆i × field of education –   
all engineering 
 (0.251) (0.292) (0.426) (0.539) 
 -0.170 -0.098 -0.050 -0.084 ∆i × field of education –  
some engineering, some mgmt. 
 (0.257) (0.284) (0.375) (0.498) 
 -0.487** -0.456* -0.531* -0.538 ∆i × leadership experience –  
all team members 
 (0.224) (0.239) (0.299) (0.447) 
 -0.558*** -0.607*** -0.668** -0.885** ∆i × leadership experience –  
some team members 
 (0.200) (0.211) (0.264) (0.430) 
 0.635** 0.811** 1.035** 0.769 ∆i × acquaintance –  
for a long time, professionally 
 (0.308) (0.327) (0.417) (0.474) 
 0.587** 0.676** 0.983*** 0.582* ∆i × acquaintance –  
for a long time, privately 
 (0.265) (0.278) (0.326) (0.347) 
 -1.127*** -1.262*** -1.249*** -1.903*** ∆i × university degree –  
all team members 
 (0.275) (0.309) (0.353) (0.445) 
 -0.644*** -0.799*** -0.667*** -0.864*** ∆i × university degree –  
some team members 
 (0.213) (0.241) (0.244) (0.308) 
 0.187 0.172 0.206 -0.167 ∆i × age of team members  
between 25 and 45 
 (0.148) (0.160) (0.197) (0.320) 
 0.071 0.210 0.439** 0.591 ∆i × age of team members  
between 35 and 45 
 (0.206) (0.199) (0.212) (0.396) 
 0.216 0.232 0.451** 0.472* ∆i × prior job experience –  
some large firm, some startup 
 (0.165) (0.175) (0.209) (0.246) 
 -0.037 0.077 0.092 0.275 ∆i × prior job experience –  
mostly startup 
 0.258 0.345 0.392 0.223 
Observations 1020 1020 1020 1020 1020 
log L -1834.9 -1796.3 -1632.3 -1267.2 -836.2 
Pseudo R² 0.150 0.168 0.183 0.217 0.266 
chi-squared 447.1 951.5 934.6 746.4 837.19 
Df 14 28 28 28 28 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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FIGURE 1 
Description of the venture as presented to interviewees 
 
 
• project is based on a patented technical product 
• considerable cost savings for users 
• value proposition is clearly visible 
• potential users are small and medium-sized industrial firms 
• a working prototype exists 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Benefit contributions of parameter values of team characteristics (specification (1)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 0,5 1 1,5 2
all team members
some team members
some engineering, some mgmt.
all engineering
some team members
all team members
all team members
some team members
for a long time, professionally
for a long time, privately
between 35 and 45
between 25 and 45
mostly start-up
some large firm, some start-up
Benefit contribution
Experience in relevant industry
(reference: no team member)
Field of education
(reference: all management)
University degree
(reference: no team member)
Leadership experience
(reference: no team members)
Mutual acquaintance
(reference: for a short time)
Age of team members
(reference: between 25 and 35)
Prior job experience
(reference: mostly large firms)
Note: benefit contribution of reference value set to zero.
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FIGURE 3 
Difference in benefit contributions between experienced and novice raters (specification (2)). 
Reading example: Experienced VCs rate “Mutual acquaintance for a long time, professionally”  
0.64 points higher.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
all team members
some team members
some engineering, some mgmt.
all engineering
some team members
all team members
all team members
some team members
for a long time, professionally
for a long time, privately
between 35 and 45
between 25 and 45
mostly start-up
some large firm, some start-up
Difference in benefit contribution
Experience in relevant industry
(reference: no team member)
Field of education
(reference: all management)
University degree
(reference: no team member)
Leadership experience
(reference: no team members)
Mutual acquaintance
(reference: for a short time)
Age of team members
(reference: between 25 and 35)
Prior job experience
(reference: mostly large firms)
-1,2 -0,8 -0,4 0 0,4 0,8Black / hatched bars: coefficients significant on 1% / 5% level
